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INTRODUCTION 
Although Caucasian males constitute a minority of the total and, 
likewise, college-educated workforce, they dominate the upper echelons of 
virtually every job sector.  Males comprise 85.7% of executive officership 
positions and 82% of directorship positions at Fortune 500 companies.1  
Men hold over 90% of leadership positions in the news media and over 
90% of all reporters are white.2  Caucasian men constitute over 86% of 
partnership positions in major law firms.  They hold 85% of tenured 
                                                          
 1. Updated Datasheet: Alliance for Board Diversity Report, ALLIANCE FOR 
BOARD DIVERSITY (July 21, 2011), available at http://Theabd.Org/Abd_Datasheet.pdf; 
Women Executive Officers in the Fortune 500, CATALYST (Last updated Dec. 14, 
2011), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-executive-officers-fortune-500. 
 2. Id. 
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college professorships3 and occupy over 80% of managerial positions in 
advertising, marketing, and public relations.4  In 1992, in the midst of the 
Supreme Court’s dismantling of state and federal affirmative action 
programs, the median weekly earnings of white males were 33% higher 
than those of any group in America.5 
Despite significant factual evidence of continued inequality in various 
employment fields, the last fifteen years have witnessed a remarkable 
decline in the use of gender-based affirmative action.6  The decision to 
abandon such programs has been spurred in large part by the Supreme 
Court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to all federal and state race-based 
affirmative action programs in the employment context regardless of 
existing racial disparity.7  While the Court’s jurisprudence has been 
confined to race-based programs, lower courts have expanded the 
approach, without basis in precedent, to gender-based programs.  Spurred 
in large part by the Supreme Court’s decision in Richmond v. Croson,8 
federal appeals courts have developed a tripartite split over the appropriate 
level of scrutiny for gender-based affirmative action programs.  In addition 
to the majority of lower courts that have split between strict scrutiny and 
intermediate scrutiny, a minority of courts have developed a third approach 
which, while calling itself intermediate scrutiny, requires a factual 
predicate demonstrating a history of discrimination on par with that 
required under strict scrutiny.9  The attack on intermediate scrutiny and, 
accordingly, gender-based affirmative action, has been buttressed by a 
subtle theoretical critique of the effectiveness of the standard to guard 
against discriminatory statutes.  The result of this regression has not only 
been confusion among courts, but an abandonment of gender-based 
affirmative action programs as various municipalities have chosen to avoid 
subjecting their programs to sure defeat under strict scrutiny review.10 
This paper will serve the dual purposes of defending intermediate 
scrutiny as the appropriate standard under the Court’s jurisprudence and 
                                                          
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Patricia Ireland, President, National Organization of Women, Keynote Address 
at the Florida National Organization of Women Conference (January 15, 2000) 
(transcript on file with the National Organization for Women) [hereinafter Ireland, 
Keynote Address]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 9. See, e.g., Danskine v. Metro Dade Cnty. Fire Dep’t, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1256-
57 (S.D. Fla. 1999) aff’d sub nom. Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep’t, 253 F.3d 1288 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
 10. See Ireland Keynote Address, supra note 6. 
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answering some of the theoretical criticisms of the effectiveness of 
intermediate scrutiny as a means to protect women from discriminatory 
statutes.  The first half of the paper will survey the progression of the 
Court’s jurisprudence with regards to statutes that differentiate on the basis 
of gender, focusing specifically on: (a) the development of the Supreme 
Court’s gender-based equal protection jurisprudence;11 (b) the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Richmond v. Croson, which dramatically altered the 
approaches of a number of lower courts toward gender-based affirmative 
action;12 and (c) the struggles of lower courts to determine the appropriate 
standard of review for gender-based affirmative action programs post-
Croson, including influential jurisprudence involving racially differential 
statutes.13  The second half of the paper will present a legal and theoretical 
defense of intermediate scrutiny as the proper standard of review for 
gender-based affirmative action programs including: (a) the fallacies 
inherent in lower court decisions applying increased scrutiny based on the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence pre and post-Croson,14 and (b) responses to 
theoretical criticisms of intermediate scrutiny, including the presentation of 
alternatives to strict scrutiny which, while they may not conclusively 
answer all criticisms, will provide a sound basis from which to defend the 
legitimacy of the approach.15 
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF GENDER-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND DECLINE OF INTERMEDIATE 
SCRUTINY 
Although the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed a case 
involving a challenge to a gender-based affirmative action employment 
program under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court’s and, likewise, lower courts’ jurisprudence is rich with decisions 
upon which to formulate the appropriate standard were such a decision to 
reach the Court.16  However, because the issue has never been addressed 
specifically, a comprehensive review of the Court’s treatment of gender-
based classifications and, likewise, affirmative action programs, is 
necessary.  The court’s jurisprudence regarding these areas can be divided 
into the two general periods: (a) a time of development, during which the 
Court formulated much of its equal protection jurisprudence, dealing 
                                                          
 11. See infra Part I.A and accompanying notes. 
 12. See infra Part I.B and accompanying notes. 
 13. See infra Part I.C and accompanying notes. 
 14. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
 15. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes. 
 16. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982); 
Brunet v. City of Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 403-04 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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skeptically with statutes that discriminated on the basis of gender but 
favorably towards those with a remedial purpose; and (b) a time of 
retrenchment, during which the Court and lower courts, while remaining 
vigilant with regards to statutes that discriminated on the basis of gender, 
have demonstrated increased hostility towards remedial programs.  
Sandwiched between the periods was the Supreme Court’s seminal 
decision in Richmond v. Croson.  While Croson dealt with a racially based 
program, the decision has served as the basis for increased attacks, both 
legal and theoretical, on the use of intermediate scrutiny for affirmative 
action in the gender context by several lower courts. 
A. The Rise of Intermediate Scrutiny: The Development of the Court’s 
Jurisprudence with Regard to Statutes That Differentiate on the Basis of 
Gender 
For nearly a century after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, 
statutes that differentiated on the basis of gender were readily approved 
under the Supreme Court’s most cursory level of review—rational basis 
scrutiny.  Beginning with Reed v. Reed,17 the Supreme Court began to 
develop a more rigid standard for such statutes.  However, the crafting of a 
definition of intermediate scrutiny proved rather difficult.  First, in large 
part influenced by the Equal Rights Amendment, the Supreme Court 
fluctuated as to whether strict scrutiny should be applied to statutes that 
differentiated on the basis of gender.  Second, in addition to statutes that 
specifically created barriers for females, the Supreme Court expressed 
special concern about statutes that, while appearing to benefit women, in 
fact did the opposite by reinforcing superficial stereotypes about their 
functions in society.  Third, because of what it saw as accepted biological 
differences between men and women, the Supreme Court developed a 
“biological differences” jurisprudence under which statutes that 
differentiated on the basis of gender would, on rare occasion, be 
approved.18 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that 
the state not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws.”19  Though broad in its proscription, the effect of the clause 
remained rather limited in its effect for nearly a century after its 
ratification.  During this period, the Court regularly upheld statutes that not 
only differentiated, but actively discriminated, on the basis of gender by 
                                                          
 17. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 71 (1971) (finding discriminatory a statute that 
favored men over women in determining the administrator of a decedent’s estate). 
 18. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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utilizing a test of “pure rational basis” scrutiny.20  If the state could 
demonstrate any possible reason for enacting the statute, the Court would 
uphold the statute.21 
Beginning with Reed, the Supreme Court increasingly expressed 
skepticism when examining such laws.  Though the Court maintained that 
rational basis remained the appropriate standard of review,22 the Court 
struck down an Idaho statute preferring males over females when 
calculating inheritance, finding the state’s interest in reducing the 
judiciary’s workload insufficient to justify the statute.23 
Within two years, the Court was again presented with a statute that 
allegedly discriminated on the basis of gender.  However, in this instance, 
the statute’s effect on women was more nebulous.  In Frontiero v. 
Richardson,24 the statute at issue provided that “spouses of male members 
of the uniformed services [were] dependents for purposes of obtaining 
increased [severance and benefits], but that spouses of female members 
[were] not dependents unless they [were] in fact dependent for over one-
half of their support.”25  The statute thereby created a presumption that 
wives receive benefits upon their husband’s death, but required that 
husbands surpass an additional evidentiary hurdle before receiving the 
same benefits after their wives’ deaths.  The Court framed the statute from 
the perspective of the deceased female spouse, concluding that the statute 
worked an invidious discrimination against female members of the military 
and, accordingly, was unconstitutional under “strict judicial scrutiny.”26 
In justifying its decision, the Court emphasized three significant points.  
First, the Court explicitly distinguished the case from one in which a 
remedial program on the basis of gender was at issue, stating explicitly: 
It should be noted that these statutes are not in any sense designed to 
rectify the effects of past discrimination against women.  On the 
contrary, these statutes seize upon a group—women—who have 
historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the 
effects of this past discrimination as a justification for heaping on 
additional economic disadvantages.27 
                                                          
 20. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). 
 21. See e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(defining this test as whether “the Legislature rationally could have believed Act 257 
would substantially advance a legitimate purpose”). 
 22. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. 
 23. Id. at 76-77. 
 24. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 688. 
 27. Id. at 689 n.22 (citations omitted). 
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Second, in favor of its position, the state asserted merely administrative 
convenience as the basis for its decision and presented no evidence in 
support of its interest.28  This suggested to the Court that the statute, instead 
of being passed upon sound reasoning and research, was in fact the product 
of an archaic gender stereotype.  Finally, while its decision that women 
were now constitutionally a “suspect class” was based on precedent, its 
decision to apply strict scrutiny was in large part influenced by 
congressional passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)—which 
explicitly guaranteed women equal treatment—and, secondarily, Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act.29  Despite the belief then that the ERA would 
receive sufficient approval, it subsequently failed to achieve the necessary 
state support.30 
In Craig v. Boren,31 the Court finally settled upon “intermediate 
scrutiny” as the appropriate standard under which to review gender-based 
classifications.  As stated by the Court, for a statute that differentiates on 
the basis of gender to be sustained, it “must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives.”32  At issue in Craig was an Oklahoma statute that prohibited 
males under the age of twenty-one and females under the age of eighteen 
from purchasing beer with an alcoholic content of 3.2%.33  Though the 
Court accepted the state’s interest in “public health and safety,”34 it found 
gender to “not be substantially related to the achievement of the statutory 
objective.”35  The state showed that 2% of eighteen to twenty-year old men, 
but only 0.18% of women of that age, were arrested for driving under the 
influence.36  Although the Court did question the statistical evidence 
                                                          
 28. Id. at 688-89 (noting that the Government’s argument rested on a contention 
that reaching the threshold to prove that a husband was financially dependent on his 
wife would not be worth the time and money). 
 29. Id. at 687 (explaining that the shift to strict scrutiny was based on Congress’s 
intention of eliminating invidious classifications). 
 30. See Deborah Rhode, Equal Rights in Retrospect, 1 LAW AND INEQUALITY 1, 10 
(1983) (discussing the reasons for the failure of the amendment). 
 31. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 32. Id. at 197 (asserting that such classifications must be based on intermediate 
scrutiny). 
 33. Id. at 192 (explaining that this distinction could deny equal protection under the 
law to males between the ages of 18-20 years). 
 34. Id. at 199-200 (finding a state’s interest in public health and safety to be an 
important government objective). 
 35. Id. at 204 (explaining that the use of statistics alone was insufficient to uphold 
the statute under an intermediate scrutiny analysis). 
 36. Id. at 201 (framing the arrest rates as a “weak answer” to the equal protection 
question posed in the Court’s analysis). 
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presented, its decision emphasized, above any statistical insufficiencies,37 
the problematic nature of a law based on “social stereotypes.”38  “The 
question,” as Justice Stevens’ concurrence explained, “[was] whether the 
traffic safety justification put forward by the State [was] sufficient to make 
an otherwise offensive classification acceptable.”39  While, the statute in 
Craig invidiously discriminated against men, in subsequent cases, the 
Court regularly applied the same standard to statutes that invidiously 
discriminated against women. 
Having determined that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for all 
gender classifications, the Court had yet to cement whether the test 
mandated—substantially related to an important governmental interest—
had the same or a similar meaning when applied in varying circumstances.  
How would the test affect a statute that, for instance, benefited females as 
opposed to males?  What if a law respected “real differences between the 
genders” as opposed to archaic stereotypes?  The Supreme Court spent 
much of the next decade answering these questions. 
Shortly after Craig, the Court was confronted with a series of cases in 
which women were immediately benefited by the challenged statutory 
scheme.  In addition to disadvantaging men, “benign gender 
classifications” benefited women economically.  However, the programs 
differed from modern day affirmative action programs in two significant 
ways.  First, in contrast to the affirmative action programs at issue in this 
paper, the statutes did not create whole scale remedial schemes aimed at 
increasing female presence in an employment field, but rather merely 
created a series of judicial presumptions upon the occasion of a death or 
divorce.40  Second, because many of the statutes focused on the assets of a 
deceased spouse, it was not clear whether women were benefited by the 
challenged statute because the deceased female spouse received an 
economic benefit, or were disadvantaged by the statute because it reduced 
the value of the work of a female employee.41 
                                                          
 37. While the Court did delve into the statistics presented, the Court cautioned 
against the dangers of conducting statistical analyses: “It is unrealistic to expect either 
members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed in the rigors of 
experimental or statistical technique.  But this merely illustrates that proving broad 
sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is 
in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.”  
Id. at 204. 
 38. Id. at 203 n.14 (relaying the perception that young men are reckless and 
irresponsible while similarly-aged women are “chivalrously escorted home” instead of 
drinking and driving). 
 39. Id. at 213 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 40. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652-53 (1975). 
 41. See id. at 653 (framing the gender-based distinction as gratuitous because it 
would only impact women who matched the basis of the statute specifically). 
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Two decisions issued prior to Craig suggested the importance of the 
specific factual nature of the case; in particular, whether the challenged law 
was motivated by a desire to equalize women’s place in society or driven 
by an archaic gender-based stereotype.  In Kahn v. Shevin,42 the Court 
upheld a Florida statute that granted widows an annual five hundred dollar 
property tax exemption.43  Appellant, a widower, challenged the exemption 
because the statute offered no analogous benefit to widowers.44  The Court, 
however, rejected petitioner’s claim, and distinguished the case from Reed 
as the state’s interest was more than mere “administrative convenience”:  
“We deal here with a state tax law reasonably designed to further the state 
policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for 
which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden.”45  The Court 
explicitly stated:  “Whether from overt discrimination or from the 
socialization process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is 
inhospitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs.”46  
In contrast, in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld,47 the Court held 
unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that granted 
survivors’ benefits, based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father 
covered by the Act, both to his widow and to the couple’s minor children in 
her care, but that granted benefits based on the earnings of a covered 
deceased wife and mother only to the minor children and not to the 
widower.48  While the Court found the state’s interest in providing for the 
female spouse “not entirely without empirical support,”49 it distinguished 
Kahn: 
[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an 
automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual 
purposes underlying a statutory scheme.  Here, it is apparent both from 
the statutory scheme itself and from the legislative history of 402 (g) that 
Congress’ purpose in providing benefits to young widows with children 
was not to provide an income to women who were, because of economic 
discrimination, unable to provide for themselves.  Rather, 402 (g), linked 
as it is directly to responsibility for minor children, was intended to 
permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care 
                                                          
 42. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974). 
 43. Id. at 352 (noting that in 1885 Florida began providing property tax exemptions 
to widows). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 355. 
 46. Id. at 353. 
 47. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 48. Id. at 637-39. 
 49. See id. at 645 (acknowledging that men were more likely than women to be the 
primary supporters of their households). 
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of children.50 
In Califano v. Goldfarb,51 the Court affirmed the vitality of the Kahn-
Weinberger distinction post-Craig.  Relying heavily on Weinberger, the 
Court held unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act under 
which survivors’ benefits, based on the earnings of a deceased husband, 
were payable to his widow regardless of dependency, but such benefits on 
the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife covered by the Act were 
payable to her widower only if he was receiving at least half of his support 
from her at the time of her death.52  As opposed to overruling Kahn, the 
Court explicitly distinguished it, reaffirming its holding.53  Relying on the 
focus of the statutory scheme and the Act’s legislative history, the Court 
reasoned that “differential treatment of nondependent widows and 
widowers result[ed] not from a deliberate congressional intention to 
remedy the arguably greater needs of the former, but rather from an 
intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage earners, coupled 
with the presumption that wives are usually dependent.”54  The Court 
emphasized that the latter was the type of archaic and overbroad 
generalization it had eschewed in its past cases.55  In addition, the Court 
added that, viewed from the earner’s perspective, the statute discriminated 
against women workers.56 
In Orr v. Orr,57 the Supreme Court struck down a similar statute under 
which husbands, but not wives, were required to pay alimony upon 
divorce.58  The Court acknowledged that “it could be argued that the 
Alabama statutory scheme was designed to provide help for needy spouses, 
using sex as a proxy for need, and to compensate women for past 
discrimination during marriage, which assertedly had left them unprepared 
to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce.”59  
However, it found “these considerations would not justify [the] scheme, 
because, under the Alabama statutes, individualized hearings at which the 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 648 (emphasis added). 
 51. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
 52. Id. at 201-02. 
 53. See id. at 209 n.8 (identifying the difference in the Kahn ruling as arising from 
the Kahn statute’s sole purpose in redressing the societal disparate treatment of 
women). 
 54. Id. at 216-17. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 209 (reasoning that because Social Security is designed for the 
protection of entire the family, its gender-based distinction is illogical). 
 57. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
 58. Id. at 270-71. 
 59. Id. at 269. 
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parties relative financial circumstances [were] considered already 
occur[ed].”60  Accordingly, there was no reason to operate by 
generalization.61 
In contrast, in Califano v. Webster,62 the Court affirmed the vitality of 
Kahn, upholding a separate provision of the Social Security Act that had 
the effect of granting higher monthly old age benefits to retired female 
workers as compared to those received by similarly situated male 
workers.63  The act provided that benefits were to be computed dependent 
upon the average monthly wage of the worker during certain statutorily 
defined “benefit computation years.”64  Rather than tying their earnings to 
those of a male spouse or children, the statutory scheme simply permitted 
women to exclude an additional three lower earning years than men.65 
However, the Court soon made clear that its archaic and overbroad 
generalization jurisprudence was not limited merely to statutes which 
assumed a women’s financial dependency upon a male or her role as child-
bearer, but in fact also included statutes which relied upon assumptions 
about the limited occupational capacity of females.  In Mississippi 
University for Women v. Hogan,66 the Court held that a college practice of 
preferring females for entrance into a nursing school, over equally qualified 
males, violated the Equal Protection Clause.67  Though the Court again 
required that the statute serve important governmental interests and the 
means employed be substantially related to their accomplishment, it 
characterized this combined burden as one requiring proof of an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification.”68  Nevertheless, the Court found that 
the statute failed both prongs of the aforementioned intermediate scrutiny 
test.69  Though the state asserted an interest in remedying societal 
discrimination against women, the Court recognized that women, rather 
than being discriminated against in the field of nursing, were 
overrepresented.70  Accordingly, the state failed to establish that the 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 281. 
 61. Id. (arguing that because these proceedings so heavily impact compensation to 
families, generalizations can be especially harmful). 
 62. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977). 
 63. Id. at 314-16. 
 64. Id. at 314. 
 65. Id. at 314-16. 
 66. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
 67. Id. at 719, 733. 
 68. Id. at 724. 
 69. Id. at 731. 
 70. See id. at 729 (noting that in 1970, women represented more than 98% of total 
nursing degrees earned nationwide). 
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“alleged objective [was] the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory 
classification,” as opposed to an archaic and overbroad generalization.71 
Concurrently, the Supreme Court developed a third category for statutes 
which did not “remedy past discrimination” or reflect “archaic and 
overbroad generalizations,” but instead accounted for alleged “biological 
differences” between the genders.  Despite the term’s implication, the 
differences recognized were not limited to merely those that were strictly 
biological.  In Rostker v. Goldberg,72 the Court upheld a statute requiring 
men, but not women, to register for the draft.73  The court reasoned, 
“women as a group, unlike men as a group, are not eligible for combat” and 
that the “President expressed his intent to continue the current military 
policy.”74  In Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court,75 the Court 
upheld a statute defining statutory rape as “an act of sexual intercourse 
accomplished with a female . . . under the age of eighteen years.”76  The 
Court reasoned that while the risk of pregnancy served as a natural 
deterrent to young females from sexual intercourse, which may ultimately 
lead to teenage pregnancy, no similar deterrent existed for males.77  
Accordingly, “a criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus served to 
roughly equalize the deterrents on the sexes.”78 
In drawing the contours of this category of cases, the Court drew an 
especially tenuous line when characterizing statutes, which differentiated 
on matters related to parent-child relationships.  In Parham v. Hughes,79 the 
Court upheld, against constitutional challenge, a Georgia statute permitting 
the mother, but not the father, of a child born to non-married patents to sue 
for the wrongful death of the child when the father had not formally 
“legitimated” the child.80  However, in Caban v. Mohammed,81 the Court 
struck down a statute that required the consent of the mother, but not the 
                                                          
 71. Id. at 730. 
 72. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 73. Id. at 59, 83. 
 74. Id. at 76-77. 
 75. Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).  
 76. Id. at 466, 481. 
 77. Id. at 473. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979). 
 80. Id. at 348-49, 358.  In the eyes of the Court, “the fact [was] that mothers and 
fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated.  Unlike the mother of an 
illegitimate child whose identity will rarely be in doubt, the identity of the father will 
frequently be unknown.”  Id. at 355. 
 81. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). 
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father, for the adoption of a child born out of wedlock.82 
B. The First Step Backwards:  The Supreme Court’s 
 Decision in Richmond v. Croson 
While the Supreme Court was struggling to determine the proper 
standard of review for statutes that differentiate on the basis of gender, it 
was also developing its jurisprudence regarding statutes that differentiate 
on the basis of race.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Croson resolved two 
conflicting lines of cases—those involving statutes that benefited 
minorities and all other statutes that differentiated on the basis of race—
determining that regardless of intent, the statute would have to survive the 
Supreme Court’s most rigid level of review: strict scrutiny. 
1. The Court’s Pre-Croson Jurisprudence with Regards to Statutes That 
Differentiate on the Basis of Race 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Court repeatedly divided over the 
appropriate standard of review for race-based affirmative action programs 
without formulating a single approach.  Meanwhile, a second line of cases 
emerged involving statutes that discriminated on the basis of race without 
any remedial purpose.  The Court subjected the latter to its “most rigid 
scrutiny,” and except in the most extreme circumstances, found them 
unconstitutional.83 
Following Brown v. Board of Education,84 the vast majority of statutes 
that discriminated on the basis of race were subjected to a rigid level of 
review by the Court and as a result were found unconstitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Between Brown in 
1954, and Croson in 1989, the Court struck down a variety of statutes 
including, among others, those that banned interracial cohabitation85 and 
marriage,86 eliminated integrated public pools,87 or rewarded custody of 
children based in part on the race of the potential stepfather.88  Meanwhile, 
the Court explicitly endorsed remedial schemes, in particular those in the 
                                                          
 82. Id. at 381-82.  Instead of focusing on the parents’ presence, the court’s decision 
centered around the parents’ interest: “This impediment to adoption usually is the result 
of a natural parental interest shared by both genders alike; it is not a manifestation of 
any profound difference between the affection and concern of mothers and fathers for 
their children.”  Id. at 391-92. 
 83. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
 84. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
 85. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 86. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
 87. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
 88. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
13
Quereshi: The Forgotten Remedy:  A Legal and Theoretical Defense of Interme
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
810 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 21:4 
context of elementary and secondary education.89 
The Court’s first encounter with an affirmative action program outside of 
this context came in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,90 
involving a program that reserved a specific number of seats for minorities 
at the University of California-Davis medical school.91  The Court’s 
judgment was controlled by Justice Powell who, writing only for himself, 
concluded that all racial classifications were subject to the same heightened 
review, and under which he found the program unconstitutional.92  The 
remaining eight justices split equally between those who would have 
applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the statute93 and those who would 
have struck it down as violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964.94  Only two 
years later in Fullilove v. Klutznick,95 the Court upheld a federal program 
that required a proportion of federal funds granted to state and local 
governments to be used to procure services or supplies from Minority 
Business Enterprises.  Mirroring his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell 
subjected the scheme to the “most stringent level of review.”96  However, 
in contrast to Bakke, he found that the remedy justified the “compelling 
governmental interest.”97 
Between 1980, when it decided Fullilove, and 1989, when it decided 
Croson, the Court remained closely divided on which affirmative action 
measures could be utilized to remedy employment discrimination.  At a 
minimum, the Court agreed that race conscious goals designed to alleviate 
past discrimination were not per se unconstitutional.98  Nonetheless, the 
court routinely struck down provisions that it found loosely drafted or 
                                                          
 89. In Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Supreme Court explicitly 
empowered local courts, as well as local school boards, to implement remedial schemes 
to address the history of school segregation in each locality.  Though the Court 
provided broad guidelines for local authorities to follow, it also invested localities with 
broad authority, including, but not limited to “revision of school districts and 
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to 
the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations 
which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.”  Id. at 300-01. 
 90. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 91. Id. at 269-70. 
 92. Id. at 291. 
 93. Id. at 324, 379 (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., 
concurring). 
 94. Id. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., Burger, J., Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 95. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 96. Id. at 496. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See e.g., Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 
475 (1986) (upholding the municipalities affirmative action plan). 
14
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss4/2
2013] THE FORGOTTEN REMEDY 811 
unconnected to the remediation of past wrongs.99  Similarly, while the 
Court made clear that such statutes posed serious constitutional problems 
and must therefore be closely scrutinized, it was unable to formulate either 
a verbal standard or describe a series of characteristics upon which it would 
base its analysis.100 
2. Richmond v. Croson 
At issue in Croson was a “Minority Business Utilization Plan” (Plan) 
adopted by the City of Richmond requiring general contractors awarded 
city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the total 
dollar value of each contract to one or more “Minority Business 
Enterprises” (MBE’s).  The Plan defined a MBE as a business from 
anywhere in the country in which at least fifty-one percent of the enterprise 
was owned and controlled by “black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, 
Eskimo, or Aleutian citizens.”101  Waivers from such requirements were 
available only upon a showing that either an insufficient number of MBE’s 
existed or were willing to participate.102  Although the Plan characterized 
itself as “remedial,”103 it was passed without the presentation of any 
empirical evidence that the city of Richmond had discriminated in 
awarding contracts or that prime contractors had discriminated in awarding 
subcontracts.104  In support of the Plan, the city council primarily 
considered evidence of current minority under-representation in the field, 
specifically: 
[A] statistical study indicating that, although the city’s population was 
50% black, only 0.67% of its prime construction contracts had been 
awarded to minority businesses in recent years; figures establishing that 
a variety of local contractors’ associations had virtually no MBE 
members; the city’s counsel’s conclusion that the Plan was constitutional 
under Fullilove v. Klutznick, and the statements of Plan proponents 
indicating that there had been widespread racial discrimination in the 
local, state, and national construction industries.105 
Croson, the sole bidder, upon denial of a waiver and subsequently the 
                                                          
 99. See e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 199 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“But protection of the rights of nonminority workers demands that a racial 
goal not substantially exceed the percentage of minority group members in the relevant 
population or work force absent compelling justification.”). 
 100. See e.g., Winston Riddick, Overview of U.S. Supreme Court Affirmative Action 
Decisions in Race and Gender Cases, 23 S.U. L. REV. 107, 111-13 (1996). 
 101. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989). 
 102. Id. at 478-79. 
 103. Id. at 478. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 479-80. 
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prime contract, filed suit alleging that the Plan was unconstitutional under 
the Equal Protection Clause.106 
For the first time, five members of the Court agreed that strict scrutiny 
was the appropriate standard for statutes that differentiated on the basis of 
race, regardless of any benign or discriminatory legislative intent.107  In 
doing so, the Court explicitly rejected an intermediate standard of review as 
insufficient.  It explained: 
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining what 
classifications are “benign” or “remedial” and what classifications are 
in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple 
racial politics.  Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” 
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing 
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool . . . .  
[Using intermediate review] [o]nce the “remedial” conclusion is reached, 
the dissent’s standard is singularly deferential, and bears little 
resemblance to the close examination of legislative purpose we have 
engaged in when reviewing classifications based either on race or 
gender.108 
The Court additionally suggested that because it did not require specific 
evidence of discrimination in the locality, the intermediate scrutiny 
standard would allow a historically disadvantaged group currently in the 
majority essentially limitless scope and duration to utilize race-based 
schemes—potentially to a degree beyond that necessary to redress any 
discrimination suffered.109  Finally, the Court suggested that without the 
factual basis requirement imposed by strict scrutiny, the fact finder may not 
be able to determine whether the problem the state seeks to remedy actually 
exists.110  That is, the problem may not be that African-Americans are not 
being selected because of their race but rather “because of deficiencies in 
working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, unfamiliarity with 
bidding procedures, or disability caused by an inadequate track record”—
problems which, in the eyes of the court, afflict all ethnic groups equally.111 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 483. 
 107. Id. at 493. 
 108. Id. at 493, 495. 
 109. See id. at 495-96 (“In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50% of the 
population of the city of Richmond.  Five of the nine seats on the city council are held 
by blacks.  The concern that a political majority will more easily act to the 
disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts 
would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny 
in this case.”). 
 110. Id. at 498. 
 111. Id. at 499. 
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Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the Plan failed both prongs 
of the test—the state was unable to show that the statutory scheme served a 
compelling governmental interest or was narrowly tailored to accomplish 
such.112  The Court rejected the state’s asserted interest in remedying prior 
race-based discrimination, not because such an interest would never be 
sufficient, but because the state’s interest was merely a generalized 
remedial assertion.  In the eyes of the Court, because no specific history of 
discrimination was proven or considered, “[the evidence] provided no 
guidance for the city’s legislative body to determine the precise scope of 
the injury it [sought] to remedy.”113  Therefore, after Croson, to survive 
strict scrutiny, “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of 
constitutional or statutory violations must be made” in the specific field the 
program affects, and which occurred in the specific locality passing the 
legislation.114 
C. The Decline of Intermediate Scrutiny: The Supreme Court’s and Lower 
Courts’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence After Croson 
Though the Supreme Court has not decided another case involving a 
“benign” gender classification after Hogan, lower courts’ jurisprudence 
with regard to gender-based affirmative action programs has significantly 
shifted after Croson.  While the majority of circuits continue to apply 
intermediate scrutiny, a minority have split over whether to apply strict 
scrutiny, or alternatively intermediate scrutiny, with Croson’s strict factual 
predicate.115  Meanwhile, the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence has largely been limited to race-based affirmative action 
programs and gender-based discriminatory schemes.  However, a number 
of scholars aware of the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s increased 
scrutiny of race-based affirmative action programs have entered the 
discussion in favor of strict scrutiny for all gender classifications. 
1. The Varied Standards Lower Courts After Croson Have Applied to 
Gender-Based Affirmative Action Programs 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court in Croson confined its decision 
to race-based classifications, a limited number of circuits have adopted 
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for gender-based 
affirmative action programs.  A second group of circuit courts, while 
continuing to espouse intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard of 
                                                          
 112. Id. at 505-507. 
 113. Id. at 498. 
 114. Id. at 497. 
 115. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 958 (10th 
Cir. 2003). 
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review, have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as requiring Croson’s 
strict factual predicate before a remedial program can be undertaken.  
However, the majority of circuit courts after Croson have continued to 
apply intermediate scrutiny when examining such programs. 
i.   Strict Scrutiny 
Only the Sixth Circuit and the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have 
consistently applied strict scrutiny when reviewing gender-based 
affirmative action programs.  The Seventh Circuit has also applied strict 
scrutiny in each of the gender-based affirmative action cases it has decided.  
However, its decisions have not been constitutionally based. 
In Conlin v. Blanchard,116 the Sixth Circuit invalidated a gender and 
race-based affirmative action program after applying strict scrutiny 
uniformly to both aspects of the program.117  The court provided no 
explanation as to why strict scrutiny was appropriate to the gender-based 
classification beyond citing the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed.118  In Wygant, decided during the period 
between Bakke and Croson, a plurality of the Court concluded that strict 
scrutiny was the appropriate standard for race-based affirmative action 
programs.119 
The Federal Circuit invalidated a similar program that instructed Air 
Force personnel to consider the discrimination that a woman or minority 
may have endured before determining whether an individual employed by 
the military should be involuntarily terminated.120  The court without 
citation or explanation stated that both classifications were subject to strict 
scrutiny and invalidated both.121  Curiously, the court, in a footnote, cited 
United States v. Virginia’s “exceedingly persuasive justification”122 
language, though it ignored entirely the Court’s explicit admission that it 
was applying intermediate scrutiny. 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has also applied a single strict scrutiny 
standard when analyzing affirmative action plans that differentiate on the 
basis of race and gender.  However, the court in each case has done so only 
because the state failed to argue that each classification merited a different 
standard.  Furthermore, in two of the cases, the court did so only after 
                                                          
 116. Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989).  
 117. Id. at 812. 
 118. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 119. Id. at 283-84 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 115 and accompanying 
text. 
 120. Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1082 (2002). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at n.1. 
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explicitly stating that the issue remained an open one in the Seventh 
Circuit.  In Milwaukee Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler,123 after acknowledging that 
the Supreme Court did “not consider discrimination against women to be as 
invidious” and thus, “maybe the state’s program, insofar as it favors 
women, [was] not controlled by Croson,” Judge Posner concluded that “the 
state [had] waived the argument by failing to make it, and by its silence 
[had] thus conceded that Croson applies to affirmative action in favor of 
women just as it does to affirmative action in favor of blacks and other 
racial and ethnic minorities.”124  The court has since twice used identical 
reasoning to strike down similar statutes.125 
ii.  Intermediate Scrutiny “Plus” 
Meanwhile, the Fourth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, after Croson, have 
maintained the characterization of the scrutiny applied to gender-based 
affirmative action programs as “intermediate”; however, in application, 
each circuit has required a factual predicate equivalent to that required by 
the Supreme Court in Croson. 
In Lamprecht v. FCC,126 then-Judge Clarence Thomas, writing for the 
D.C. Circuit, found unconstitutional the FCC’s adoption of three programs 
that would cumulatively have had the effect of increasing female 
ownership of broadcast stations: the awarding of tax certificates, the 
holding of distress sales, and the giving of preferences in the comparative-
licensing process.127  While the court, relying upon Craig, declared 
intermediate scrutiny to be the appropriate standard, it analyzed the factual 
basis presented by the state in a manner reminiscent of Croson.  Though 
the court accepted the state’s interest in furthering the diversity of 
                                                          
 123. Milwaukee Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
500 U.S. 954 (1991). 
 124. Id. at 422. 
 125. See N. Contr., Inc. v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715, 720 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (“As we 
have previously discussed, the Supreme Court has not made clear whether a more 
permissive standard applies to programs, such as this one, which also involve gender 
classifications, but IDOT does not argue for a more permissive standard for its gender-
based initiatives and therefore we will apply strict scrutiny to the entire program.”); see 
also Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. Cnty. of Cook, 123 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“The parties in this case do not argue that there could be different 
results as between the preferences for minorities and the preference for women. 
Plaintiff argues that there is no justifiable basis for either of the preferences, and 
defendants contend that both preferences are amply justified by the evidence. 
Therefore, while recognizing that there are different levels of scrutiny for the two 
groups, it will not be necessary to make a separate analysis of the evidence applicable 
to minorities and to women.”). 
 126. Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 127. Id. at 383-84. 
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programming,128 it disputed whether the evidence presented proved that the 
means utilized—increasing female ownership of media stations—
accomplished this goal.129  The FCC among other things presented 
evidence that: (1) “of the recipients of the 1986 “National Commendation 
Awards” for presenting women in a “positive and realistic light,” women 
made up 58.5% of the producers, 84.2% of the writers, and 92.9% of the 
reporter/hosts;”130 (2) women are majority owners of only 8.6% of AM 
stations, 9% of FM stations, and 2.8% of television stations;131 and (3) 
stations owned by women are “twenty percent more likely than stations 
owned by men to broadcast “women’s programming,” and about thirty 
percent more likely than stations owned by non-minorities to broadcast 
“minority programming.”132  In rejecting the FCC’s claim, the court 
presented a series of counter statistics, which in its view proved the 
negligible effects of the program.133 
Similarly, in Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Department,134 the Eleventh 
Circuit, though applying intermediate scrutiny, required that the local 
government prove that it had specifically discriminated against women “in 
the economic sphere at which the affirmative action program is 
directed.”135  However, in contrast to Lamprecht, the Danskine court upheld 
the state’s preferential program aimed at the increased employment of 
female firefighters.136  Among other things, it emphasized the history of 
discrimination within the particular department on which the program 
focused: 
The Fire Department excluded women from its workforce up until the 
early 1980s; that as recently as 1983 the Department’s workforce was 
only one percent female while the general population of Dade County 
                                                          
 128. See id. at 384 (“We hold that merit for female ownership and participation is 
warranted upon essentially the same basis as the merit given for black ownership and 
participation, but that it is a merit of lesser significance.”). 
 129. Id. at 398. 
 130. Id. at 396. 
 131. Id. at 409 (Mikva, J., dissenting). 
 132. Id. at 404 (Mikva, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 397; see also H.B. Rowe Co., Inc. v. Tippett, 615 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 
2010) (rejecting a state program that set goals for the number of females receiving state 
construction contracts, because even though women on average earned contracts that 
were worth only one-third of the contracts afforded men, the state failed to present 
evidence that private and public employers discriminated against women and that 
women personally felt discriminated against; thus, the disparity may have been the 
result of “mere chance”). 
 134. Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep’t, 253 F.3d 1288  (11th Cir. 2001). 
 135. Id. at 1294. 
 136. Id. at 1289. 
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was fifty-two percent female.137 
iii.  Intermediate Scrutiny 
However, the Second,138 Third,139 Fifth,140 Ninth,141 and Tenth Circuits142 
have continued to apply the intermediate scrutiny standard initially 
formulated in Craig and described later as “exceedingly persuasive” in 
Hogan.143  Emblematic of this approach is the Tenth Circuit’s decision in 
Concrete Works of Colorado v. Denver, in which it upheld Denver’s 
established participation goals for racial minorities and women on certain 
city construction and professional design projects.144  As opposed to 
requiring a strict factual predicate, the court accepted as sufficient evidence 
that the state’s decision was the result of “reasoned analysis rather than . . .  
                                                          
 137. Id. at 1290. 
 138. United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 136 n.76 (2011). 
 139. See Contractors Ass’n v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990, 1001 (3d Cir. 1993) (“We 
agree with the district court’s choice of intermediate scrutiny to review the Ordinance’s 
gender preference.”). 
 140. The sole case from the Fifth Circuit to involve an equal protection challenge to 
a gender-based affirmative action program is Dallas Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of 
Dallas, 150 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 1998).  At issue was an affirmative action program that 
allegedly resulted in the promotion of “black, hispanic [sic], and female firefighters 
ahead of male, nonminority firefighters who had scored higher on the promotion 
examinations.”  Id. at 440.  According to the decision, the city failed to present any 
evidence in support of the gender-based classification.  Id. at 441-42.  Accordingly, the 
court invalidated the statute using intermediate scrutiny.  Id.  Given the absolute lack of 
empirical evidence in support of the statute, it is not clear whether the Court was 
applying a standard more akin to intermediate scrutiny or intermediate “plus.” 
 141. See Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 932 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e 
shall employ intermediate scrutiny to review King County’s [Women-Owned Business 
Enterprise] program.”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992). 
 142. See KT&G Corp. v. AG of Okla., 535 F.3d 1114, 1137 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In 
addition, there is an intermediate scrutiny which applies, for example, to gender-based 
classifications.”); see also Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 321 
F.3d 950, 959 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Denver can meet its burden by demonstrating that the 
gender-based preferences ‘serve[] important governmental objectives’ and are 
‘substantially related to achievement of those objectives’.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1027 (2003). 
 143. Concrete Works of Colo., 321 F.3d at 959.  As stated by the Court: “To 
withstand CWC’s challenge, Denver must establish an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” for those measures.  Denver can meet its burden by demonstrating that the 
gender-based preferences “serve[] important governmental objectives” and are 
“substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”  Id.  While the Second 
Circuit has yet to decide the issue, recently the district court for the Eastern District of 
New York suggested that it may also adhere to the same standard.  Id. 
 144. Id. at 954. 
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the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions.”145  
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the city was under no burden to 
identify any specific practice or policy that resulted in discrimination.146  
The city’s only burden was to introduce evidence which raised the 
inference of discriminatory exclusion in the local construction industry and 
that it linked its spending to that discrimination.147  According to the court, 
such an inference could arise from statistical disparities presented.148 
2. Relevant Supreme Court Jurisprudence After Croson 
The Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has been rather 
limited since Croson in the context of statutes that differentiate on the basis 
of gender.  The Court, in applying the Craig standard, has considered three 
gender-based statutes, approving only the most recent on the grounds that it 
represented a “biological difference” between men and women.149  
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court has considered four racial affirmative 
action programs in the educational and employment context, approving 
only one on the narrowest of grounds. 
i.  Gender Classification Jurisprudence 
In J.E.B. v. Alabama,150 the Supreme Court held that a state’s use of 
peremptory challenges to exclude male jurors on the basis of their gender 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.151  
Utilizing the Court’s language from Hogan, the Court required that the 
state advance an exceedingly persuasive justification, i.e., a demonstration 
that the statute is substantially related to a legitimate state interest.152  The 
state, presenting a single report in support of its claim, argued that persons 
of each gender were more likely to support claims of someone of their own 
gender.153  Finding that the authors of the report themselves had disavowed 
such a conclusion,154 the Court concluded that the state’s argument in 
actuality masked an unconstitutional, archaic, and overbroad stereotype.155  
                                                          
 145. Id. at 959. 
 146. Id. at 970. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 971. 
 149. See Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Sup. Ct., 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981). 
 150. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 151. Id. at 128. 
 152. Id. at 136-37. 
 153. Id. at 138 n.9. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 137-38. 
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The Court emphasized that even if sufficient data had been presented, the 
stereotype would have been fatal to the practice.156  The message sent by 
the policy “to all those in the courtroom, and all those who may later learn 
of the discriminatory act, is that certain individuals, for no reason other 
than gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important 
questions upon which reasonable persons could disagree.”157 
Two years later, the Court again struck down a statute based on 
unfounded characterizations.  In United States v. Virginia,158 the Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional a Virginia policy that barred women from 
admission to the Virginia Military Institute.159  Characterizing the Hogan 
language as requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification”,160 the 
Court rejected as illegitimate the state interest asserted—namely that “the 
adversative method of training [provided by VMI] provided educational 
benefits that [could not] be made available, unmodified, to women” and 
that any alterations would destroy the model.161  The Court relied heavily 
on the history of exclusion of women from various educational fields, and 
disregarded the expert testimony presented by the state, concluding that the 
policy, in light of the nation’s history, qualified as an unconstitutional and 
archaic generalization.162  While not central to her decision, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, who argued many of the gender classification cases before 
the Court during the 1970s,163 explicitly emphasized that despite the 
Court’s increasing skepticism of gender-based classifications, gender-based 
classifications could be used to compensate women for particular economic 
disabilities suffered as a result of their gender,164 to promote equal 
                                                          
 156. See id. at 140 (explaining that discrimination in jury selection has harmful 
effects on the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are “wrongfully 
excluded from the judicial process”). 
 157. Id. at 142. 
 158. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 159. See id. at 541 (finding that Virginia failed to provide persuasive evidence that a 
school’s male-only entrance policy was in furtherance of a state policy of diversity). 
 160. Id. at 531. 
 161. Id. at 540, 544-45. 
 162. See id. at 541-44 (“The notion that admission of women would downgrade 
VMI’s stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is a 
judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other ‘self-fulfilling 
prophec[ies],’ once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities . . . .”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 163. Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 
829-30 (1990). 
 164. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 
(1977)) (per curiam). 
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employment opportunities,165 and to advance the full development of the 
talent and capacities of citizens.166 
Despite its growing criticism of gender-based classifications, the Court 
in Nguyen v. INS,167 suggested that biological differences existed between 
the genders, and thus, could justify such a classification even when the 
state failed to provide evidentiary support.  In Nguyen, the statute, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1409,168 under an equal protection challenge, was upheld by the Supreme 
Court despite its imposition of differing requirements for an immigrant 
child’s acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent 
was the mother or the father.169  Applying the language from Hogan,170 the 
Court accepted, among other things, the government’s interest in assuring a 
legitimate parent-child connection in such matters and found the gender-
based presumption to be substantially related to its interests.171  Though 
five justices sided with the majority, the Court’s female justices dissented, 
emphasizing that the stereotypical assumption behind the statute—that 
women were the primary caretakers of children—was of the type the Court 
had consistently rejected after Hogan.172 
ii.  Racial Classification Jurisprudence 
In contrast, the Supreme Court has consistently applied strict scrutiny to 
racial classifications, while, in most instances, also demanding increasingly 
more of the government.  In Adarand Constructors v. Peña,173 the Supreme 
Court extended Croson to federal affirmative action programs, reasoning 
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard under which to examine a 
federal program giving prime contractors financial incentives to hire 
subcontractors certified as “small businesses controlled by socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals,” under the presumption that such 
                                                          
 165. Id. (quoting California  Fed.  Sav.  &  Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 
(1987)). 
 166. Id. at 533-34. 
 167. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64 (2001). 
 168. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2013). 
 169. A child born abroad and out of wedlock acquires at birth the nationality status 
of a citizen mother who meets a specified residency requirement.  § 1409(c).  However, 
when the father is the citizen parent, inter alia, one of three affirmative steps must be 
taken before the child turns eighteen: legitimization, a declaration of paternity under 
oath by the father, or a court order of paternity.  § 1409(a)(4).  The failure to satisfy this 
section renders Nguyen ineligible for citizenship. 
 170. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70. 
 171. See id. at 73 (noting that this presumption was gained from the fact that every 
woman must necessarily be present at her child’s birth). 
 172. Id. at 88-90 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 173. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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a group included an increased number of minorities.174  Though the Court 
denied that strict scrutiny was “fatal in fact,”175 the Court cited a single 
case, decided before Croson, in which a racial classification survived strict 
scrutiny.176 
Despite its prior pronouncements, the Court drew a narrow exception for 
racial classifications in the context of higher education.  In Grutter v. 
Bollinger177 and Gratz v. Bollinger,178 the Court split over a series of 
affirmative action cases concerning the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate program and its law school.  While the court struck down a 
program which used a mathematical bonus system for minorities,179 the 
Court, in a five to four decision, upheld the Law School’s preference 
program as narrowly tailored to the state’s compelling interest in achieving 
a diverse educational environment.180  Importantly, the Court noted that 
while strict scrutiny applies to “all governmental uses of race . . . not all are 
invalidated by it.”181  Rather, “context matters.”182  In Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,183 the Court struck 
down two secondary school plans that considered race as a factor when 
determining whether a minority or non-minority student would be allowed 
to transfer from one secondary school to another.184  While the majority 
decision emphasized, in part, the computational nature of the plan,185 the 
Court also emphasized that any deference afforded in the context in higher 
education was not applicable to plans enacted by elementary and secondary 
schools.186  Additionally, the Court’s recent acceptance of certiorari in 
                                                          
 174. See id. at 204-05, 226 (discussing Croson’s explanation  of  why  “strict 
scrutiny  of  all  governmental  racial  classifications  is  essential”). 
 175. Id. at 237. 
 176. See id. at 226-27 (referencing Metro Broadcasting’s unique ruling that certain 
racial classifications should be treated less skeptically than others; and the race of the 
benefited group is critical to the determination of which standard of review  to apply). 
 177. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 178. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 179. See id. at  255, 275-76 (finding that the admissions policy violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981). 
 180. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
 181. Id. at 326-27. 
 182. Id. at 327. 
 183. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 184. Id. at 709-711, 783. 
 185. See id. at 723 (stating that the method employed in this case does not provide 
for a meaningful individualized review of applicants, but instead rely on racial 
classifications in a non-individualized, mechanical way). 
 186. See id. at 770-71 (arguing that the Grutter decision was dependent upon 
“features unique to higher education” that were not present in elementary and 
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Fisher v. University of Texas,187 which involved a scheme nearly identical 
to the one the Court approved in Grutter188 and invited harsh questioning 
from several of the justices during the hearings of the case,189 has caused 
concern that strict scrutiny in the context of racial classifications may 
indeed be fatal in fact. 
3.  Scholarly Criticism of Intermediate Scrutiny 
Buttressed by the Court’s increasing scrutiny of race-based affirmative 
action programs and a number of lower courts’ increased scrutiny of such 
programs in the gender context, a number of scholars have weighed in and 
criticized the application of intermediate scrutiny to gender-based 
classifications.  Their criticisms can be classified into four categories: (a) 
doctrinal arguments that strict scrutiny is the correct approach based on the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence;190 (b) insufficient protection arguments 
that intermediate scrutiny is insufficient to guard against invidious or 
discriminatory statutes;191 (c) stigmatic arguments that a lower level of 
scrutiny implicitly delivers a message that women are less important than 
other minority groups;192 and (d) inconsistency arguments that the Court’s 
                                                          
secondary education, such as “the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated 
with  the university environment, the special niche in the constitutional tradition 
occupied by universities, and the freedom of a university to make  its own judgments as 
to education and selection of its student body”) (citations omitted). 
 187. 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). 
 188. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 216-17 (describing University of Texas at Austin’s 
system of guaranteeing admission to Texas students in the top ten percent of their 
class). 
 189. See Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as Factor at Universities, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 2012, at A1 (stating the Justice Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas shared a 
skepticism of government programs that take race into account). 
 190. See Dale A. Riedel, By Way of the Dodo: The Unconstitutionality of the 
Selective Service Act Male-Only Registration Requirement Under Modern Gender-
Based Equal Protection, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 135, 148 (2003) (arguing that the 
intermediate scrutiny plus test is the appropriate test after VMI); see also Jason Skaggs, 
Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. Virginia’s 
“Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1193 (1998) 
(arguing that there has been a progression in the level of scrutiny required for gender-
based affirmative action programs).  
 191. See e.g., John Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 508, 538 (1993)  (discussing the special dangers of racial and sex stereotyping). 
 192. See Collin O’Connor Udell, Signaling A New Direction In Gender 
Classification Scrutiny: United States v. Virginia, 29 CONN. L. REV. 521, 557 (1996) 
(“[I]t would be difficult, indeed, to justify applying strict scrutiny to racial affirmative 
action programs without applying it to gender-based affirmative action programs as 
well.  The rationale behind Croson and Adarand stressed the individual’s right to equal 
treatment, regardless of the group to which she belonged, and it is equally applicable to 
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jurisprudence with regard to racial and gender-based affirmative action is 
theoretically inconsistent based on the Equal Protection Clause’s original 
intention to aid African-Americans.193 
II. A SECOND CHANCE: THE CONTINUED LEGAL AND THEORETICAL 
VIABILITY OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AFTER CROSON 
Despite the criticisms from circuit courts and legal scholars, intermediate 
scrutiny remains the appropriate standard under which to review gender-
based affirmative action programs.  Considering that the Supreme Court 
generally applies intermediate scrutiny when analyzing gender-based 
claims and is especially lenient when considering benign classifications, 
the strict scrutiny argument is not persuasive from a doctrinal perspective.  
Arguments stressing the theoretical inconsistency of a more lenient 
standard for gender-based remedial schemes as opposed to race-based 
programs, while compelling, assume that Croson, which in fact created the 
discrepancy, was correctly decided.  More compelling are the stigmatic and 
insufficient protection arguments.  While they each present significant 
concerns, viable alternatives are available that, in contrast to strict scrutiny, 
will not have the practical effect of eliminating affirmative action programs 
for women. 
 
 
A. The Legal Basis: Why Intermediate Scrutiny Remains the Appropriate 
Standard for Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under the Court’s 
Precedent 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never addressed the 
constitutionality of a gender-based affirmative action program in the 
employment context, three doctrinal considerations suggest that 
intermediate scrutiny would be the appropriate standard under which to 
review such programs.  First, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dictates 
that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard for all benign gender 
classifications.194  Second, often when lower courts apply strict scrutiny, 
                                                          
gender-based affirmative action.”). 
 193. See Skaggs, supra note 190, at 1175 (arguing that use of intermediate scrutiny 
for sex based classifications yields results that are at odds with the Court’s emphasis on 
historic discrimination against protected groups as justification for invoking heightened 
scrutiny). 
 194. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that for a statute that 
differentiates on the basis of gender to be sustained, it “must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives”); see also Udell, supra note 192, at 527-28 (stating that Craig created a 
new standard of intermediate scrutiny). 
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they do so while considering race-based and gender-based programs 
jointly.195  Third, while “intermediate plus” may seem to be a suitable 
compromise, the Supreme Court, when applying intermediate scrutiny, has 
focused on the purpose and legislative history of the statute, as opposed to 
strength of the empirical evidence presented in support of the asserted 
interest.196 
1. The Supreme Court’s Gender-Based Jurisprudence Makes Clear That 
Intermediate Scrutiny is the Appropriate Standard. 
A review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that 
intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard for gender-based 
affirmative action schemes.  The Sixth Circuit in Long incorrectly adopted 
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard under which to judge gender-
based affirmative action claims and ignored significant Supreme Court 
jurisprudence to the contrary.  Specifically, in making its decision, the 
Sixth Circuit relied exclusively on the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Croson and Frontiero.197 
Citing Croson, the court concluded that affirmative action programs are 
appropriately judged under a strict scrutiny standard.198  The court in its 
analysis made no mention of the fact that the statute at issue in Croson 
involved solely a racial classification.199  None of the justices in any of 
their separate opinions suggested that their ruling extended beyond racial 
classifications.200 
Likewise, the court’s reliance on Frontiero was similarly misguided.  
First, Frontiero was followed by a series of cases, including the Supreme 
Court’s seminal decision in Craig, which established intermediate scrutiny 
as the appropriate standard of review for all gender classifications.201  
Notably, the Frontiero decision was the sole decision to use strict scrutiny 
when reviewing a gender-based classification.  The court’s decision in 
                                                          
 195. See e.g., Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989) (considering a 
case where the Michigan Department of Transportation used a hiring criteria based on 
race or gender when the applicant’s race or gender was underrepresented in the relevant 
labor market). 
 196. See e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136-40 (1994). 
 197. See Long v. Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 198. Id. 
 199. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) (assessing a 
contracting arrangement where prime contractors were required to issue a certain 
percentage of subcontracts to businesses controlled and owned by racial minorities). 
 200. Cf. id. 
 201. See Udell, supra note 192, at 527-28 (stating that the intermediate scrutiny 
standard was established for gender discrimination purposes in Craig and has been 
consistently employed ever since). 
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Long did not mention the nearly thirty years of cases since, in which the 
Supreme Court has continually applied the intermediate scrutiny 
standard.202  Second, even if we were to ignore decades of jurisprudence, 
Frontiero occurred after congressional passage of the Equal Rights 
Amendment.203  Even if the court considered applying strict scrutiny to all 
gender-based classifications, its approach was heavily influenced by the 
context of the times.  Third, while the Supreme Court suggested in 
Frontiero that “strict judicial review” may be appropriate, it was evaluating 
a statute that disadvantaged the value of the work of the female 
employee.204  Accordingly, there was a reasonable basis to argue that the 
statute, instead of benefiting female spouses, had a detrimental effect on a 
significant portion of females.  In contrast, gender-based affirmative action 
programs have no similar adverse effect on a significant portion of the 
female population.205  Rather, females enjoy the benefit of these programs 
across the board.  The Supreme Court stated as much, noting that the 
analysis would have differed had a benign classification been at issue.206  
The arguments of scholars in support of strict scrutiny are no more 
persuasive.  Their arguments suggest that the Court has in fact been 
gradually heightening the standard of review for gender classifications.  
The argument takes one of two versions.  First, some scholars suggest that 
the Supreme Court’s use of the terminology “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” in a number of cases subsequent to Hogan indicates a stricter 
level of review.207  Second, other scholars suggest that while repeating the 
intermediate scrutiny test, the Court actually has been conducting a more 
stringent review.208 
As to the semantic argument, while the Court describes intermediate 
                                                          
 202. See Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1192 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 203. See supra notes 29 and accompanying text. 
 204. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (“With these 
considerations in mind, we can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like 
classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and 
must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”). 
 205. Cf. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (examining a 
nursing school’s policy of excluding all male applicants and allowing admission only 
for female students); supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court in 
Frontiero made sure to point out that this was not a statute designed to rectify the 
history of discrimination against women, but a statute which was to their detriment). 
 207. See e.g., Skaggs, supra note 190, at 1183 (writing that the “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” standard established in Hogan was a more demanding level of 
scrutiny than intermediate scrutiny). 
 208. See e.g., Reidel, supra note 190, at 137 (stating that the Supreme Court 
implemented a “new version of the intermediate scrutiny test” in the cases after its 
establishment by adding a third prong to the original two prong test). 
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scrutiny as requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification,” it defines 
this test as merely the intermediate scrutiny standard from Craig—that a 
measure be substantially related to an important governmental interest.209  
Furthermore, none of the cases in which the Court used this verbal 
formulation involved benign gender classifications.210 
While the substantive argument is more compelling, it is similarly 
problematic.  Though the Supreme Court, while utilizing the “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” language invalidated a greater number of cases, 
this was largely due to the comparable simplicity of these cases.  In J.E.B, 
the Court considered a practice that allowed men to be barred from juries 
on the basis of gender.211  Similarly, in VMI, the court invalidated a policy 
that barred women from an all-male military school solely on the basis of 
their gender.212  Each of these cases stunk of the type of discrimination the 
Supreme Court struck down when dismantling segregation in the post-
Brown period.213  In Nguyen, where the issue was somewhat closer—
whether admitted biological differences between women and men justified 
a presumption of citizenship in favor of the child of an American citizen 
mother and a non-citizen father as opposed to the converse—the Court 
upheld the statute.214 
In contrast, many of the statutes the Court considered and invalidated 
prior to the formulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard involved 
statutes where the discrimination was much more subtle and, accordingly, 
required closer attention from the Court.  The Court in Weinberger 
concluded, after only a cursory examination of the legislative history, that a 
statute that gave a financial bonus to women, and thus seemed to be on its 
face benign, actually demeaned the value of their work and furthered a 
“homemaker” stereotype.215  Similarly in Orr, the Court examined a statute 
that created a presumption of alimony for the female divorcee.  Though the 
Court acknowledged the purely benign purpose behind the statute, the 
Court nonetheless advised guarding against stereotypes and reasoned that 
                                                          
 209. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (using the case of J.E.B. v. 
Alabama to demonstrate that the standard of “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
required the same test used under the intermediate scrutiny test). 
 210. See supra notes 66-68, 150, 158 and accompanying text (referring to the Hogan 
case’s exclusion of males from nursing schools, the J.E.B. case’s use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude male jurors, and the VMI case’s prohibition on admitting women 
to the Virginia Military Institute). 
 211. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994). 
 212. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996). 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 85 (recounting several race-based cases the 
Court struck down after its decision in Brown). 
 214. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001). 
 215. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975). 
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when one was available, a narrower remedial scheme should have been 
utilized.216 
2. When Lower Courts Utilize Strict Scrutiny, It Has Been the Result of 
Confusion. 
The decisions of the lower courts to apply strict scrutiny, rather than 
being based on sound precedent, have been the result of confusion and 
mistake.  In particular, decisions adopting a standard of review more 
stringent than intermediate scrutiny have often been complicated by the 
fact that they involved challenges to statutes that granted benefits to racial 
minorities, as well as women. 
In many of these cases, as opposed to recognizing the Supreme Court’s 
varying jurisprudence with regard to each type of suspect classification, 
these courts have analyzed the racial provisions under strict scrutiny, while 
at the same time ignoring that distinct gender-conscious provisions were 
also at issue.  In Conlin, the Sixth Circuit completely failed to distinguish 
between discrimination aimed at race-based minorities and discrimination 
against women.217  The court looked to Wygant despite the fact that only a 
plurality of the Court218 adopted a strict scrutiny standard of review for 
race-based classifications.219  What the Conlin court failed to articulate, 
however, was that the gender-based set-aside programs were subject to a 
more lenient standard of review.  Instead, the court erroneously grouped the 
gender-based set-aside provisions with the race-based portions of the act 
during its review.220   
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Milwaukee Pavers, rather than 
deciding the issue on its merits, simply deemed the argument waived, as 
Plaintiffs’ counsel failed to argue that the gender-based portion of the 
statute was subject to a lesser degree of scrutiny.221  The limited 
constitutional significance of the decision was highlighted when the court 
was faced with a similar statute nine years later in Builders Association of 
Chicago, in which the court avoided relying on the Milwaukee Pavers 
precedent and instead again concluded that the argument was waived 
                                                          
 216. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). 
   217.   Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 218. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986) (stating that 
strict scrutiny is to be used in assessing racial classifications). 
 219. See Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989) (looking to Wygant 
and holding that “any remedy which uses sex or race must be narrowly tailored to 
survive scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment”). 
 220. See id. 
   221.   See supra note 123-124 and accompanying text. 
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because it was not presented.222 
3. Intermediate Scrutiny “Plus” Focuses Incorrectly on a History of 
Discrimination and Not Legislative History and Statutory Scheme. 
Recognizing the Supreme Court’s continuous application of the 
intermediate scrutiny standard to all gender-based classifications, while 
also acknowledging the Court’s increased scrutiny of racial-based 
affirmative action programs, a minority of scholars suggest that the Court 
adopt intermediate scrutiny “plus” as the appropriate standard under which 
to review gender-based affirmative action programs.223  However, 
intermediate scrutiny “plus,” which focuses on empirical support as 
opposed to the statute’s text and history, is fundamentally incompatible 
with the Supreme Court’s gender jurisprudence under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Intermediate scrutiny “plus,” while not requiring that the means used by 
the remedial program be narrowly tailored, does mandate the presentation 
of a sufficient factual predicate that can demonstrate discrimination by the 
specific locality in the specific industry covered by the remedial 
program.224  For example, in Danskine, the Eleventh Circuit required the 
presentation of specific evidence that the Miami-Dade County Fire 
Department discriminated against women in the past.225  Despite the fact 
that the Commission in Lamprecht presented detailed reports describing 
disparity in station ownership and the effectiveness of the proposed 
remedy, the court, utilizing its own counter evidence, held the policy 
unconstitutional.226 
However, the Supreme Court, when assessing the legitimacy of a 
gender-based affirmative action scheme, has not required extensive proof 
of a specific factual predicate, but rather has focused on whether reliance 
on a stereotype could be discerned from the statute’s language and 
legislative history.  In Weinberger, the Court found unconstitutional a 
statute creating a presumption of social security benefits for widows with 
children because its text specifically linked women to the stereotypical role 
of homemaker.227  Likewise, in Goldfarb, the Court struck down a similar 
                                                          
 222. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Builders Ass’n of Greater Chicago v. Cnty. of Cook, 256 F.3d 642, 647 
(7th Cir. 2001); Dale A. Riedel, By Way of the Dodo: The Unconstitutionality of the 
Selective Service Act Male-Only Registration Requirement Under Modern Gender-
Based Equal Protection, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 135, 137 (2003). 
 224. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 225. See Danskine v. Miami Dade Fire Dep’t, 253 F.3d 1288, 1294 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 226. See Lamprecht, 958 F.2d at 397, 399. 
 227. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975). 
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statute that created a presumption of benefits for widows as opposed to 
widowers regardless of any dependent children.228  The Court reasoned that 
based on its legislative history and statutory scheme, it resulted not from a 
deliberate congressional intention to remedy the greater needs of widows, 
but rather from an intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage 
earners.229 
In fact, when the Court has found a discriminatory purpose, it has 
ignored statistical data presented in support of a scheme.  In Craig, despite 
the state’s presentation of statistical studies supporting the belief that 
eighteen year old men were more likely to drive intoxicated than eighteen 
year old women, the Court disregarded such presentations and focused 
instead on the legislature’s reliance on stereotypes.230  In J.E.B., the Court 
found insufficient the state’s statistical presentation in support of a state 
policy allowing males to be excluded from juries on the basis of gender 
where the policy reinforced prejudicial views of the relative abilities of 
men and women.231  Accordingly, an appropriate compromise, rather than 
requiring additional data, would involve more rigorous scrutiny of a 
scheme’s statutory structure and purpose. 
This approach is further buttressed by the institutional limitations of the 
courts.  Appellate courts do not have the resources or fact-finding 
capabilities possessed by the legislatures.232  Accordingly, it is more likely 
that the evidence considered will often suit a deciding judge’s own personal 
biases, something that the multi-member nature of the legislature prevents.  
Even assuming the availability of sufficient evidence, it is debatable 
whether available data justifies a particular policy decision, especially 
when made by a single person or small group of individuals. 
 B. The Theoretical Foundation: Responses to Criticisms Concerning 
the Wisdom of an Intermediate Scrutiny Approach 
Regardless of the lack of doctrinal support for the intermediate standard, 
scholars have presented a number of theoretical criticisms of intermediate 
scrutiny.  Chief among these are the insufficiency and stigmatic arguments; 
specifically, that the use of intermediate scrutiny for gender-based statutes 
demeans women by concurrently failing to adequately protect them and 
sending the larger message that they are deserving of less protection than 
racial minorities.233  While these arguments present serious concerns, they 
                                                          
 228. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977). 
 229. Id. at 216-17 (emphasis added). 
 230. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 208-09 (1976). 
 231. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994). 
 232. Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914, 968 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 233. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying 
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fail to consider (a) that there are viable alternative jurisprudential means of 
protecting women than resorting to the almost universally fatal strict 
scrutiny doctrine; and (b) that intermediate scrutiny for gender-based 
affirmative action programs may be framed in such a way that its use 
represents society’s commitment to alleviating its discriminatory history 
rather than continuing it.  Finally, arguments suggesting that a standard of 
review for gender-based affirmative action programs should be more 
lenient than that for race-based programs is inconsistent with the purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, assume that Croson was correctly decided. 
1. There are Significant Reasons to Believe that Intermediate Scrutiny Can 
Adequately Protect Women While Remedying Past Discrimination. 
Central to the Croson court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to all 
statutes that differentiate on the basis of gender was the supposed 
insufficiency of “intermediate scrutiny” to differentiate between those 
statutes that are genuinely aimed at remedying societal problems, and those 
statutes aimed at perpetuating the subordinate role of women through the 
use of overbroad stereotypes.  While the Court’s jurisprudence suggests 
this is a serious concern, alternate approaches exist that, unlike strict 
scrutiny, are not fatal in fact and that may sufficiently protect women 
without the risk of dismantling all gender-based affirmative action 
programs. 
While strict scrutiny does effectively protect women from discriminatory 
statutes masked as benign, the practical effect of the strict scrutiny standard 
would be the virtual elimination of almost all affirmative action programs.  
Though the Supreme Court denied that strict scrutiny is fatal in fact, its 
application in the context of racially differential statutes proves that this is 
invariably always the case.  Applying strict scrutiny, the Court has held 
unconstitutional every affirmative action employment scheme that has 
come before it, regardless of whether a federal or state statute has been at 
issue.234  Although the Court recently upheld a preference program in the 
educational admissions context at the University of Michigan,235 there are 
questions regarding the vitality of even the limited program approved in 
Grutter.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who provided the crucial swing 
vote in the Court’s decision in Grutter, has been replaced by Justice 
Samuel Alito, who has expressed disdain for affirmative action 
programs.236  Likewise, Justice Kennedy, widely recognized as the current 
                                                          
Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 962 (1996); 
Donna Meredith Matthews, Avoiding Gender Equality, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 127, 
145 (1998). 
 234. See Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995). 
 235. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
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“swing vote” on the Court, recently voted to invalidate a high school 
transfer program that considered race as one of many factors.237 
The Croson majority specifically alleged that once the supporters of 
intermediate scrutiny recognized a benign purpose, their review was 
singularly deferential.238  While this may be the case, the Croson majority’s 
analysis incorrectly ignores the level of scrutiny applied by the supporters 
of the intermediate scrutiny standard in discerning whether there is a 
benign purpose in the statute.  In this analysis, the Court is less than 
deferential.  In Hogan, despite the statute “benefiting” women by reserving 
each of the nursing school’s seats for women, the Court recognized that the 
scheme perpetuated the stereotypical role of women as assistants and more 
practically served a need that did not exist.239  In Orr, where the state’s 
scheme unnecessarily relied on gender to determine perceived inequalities, 
as the possibility of individual hearings for benefits was available, the 
Court found the statutory provision unconstitutional.240 
Admittedly, women are not protected in every circumstance by 
intermediate scrutiny.  Specifically, in the context of its “biological 
differences” jurisprudence, the Court’s decisions in Michael M., which 
assumed that women would be discouraged from sexual activity by the 
possibility of pregnancy,241 and Rostker, which deferred to Congress’ 
decision to exclude women from the military, are especially troubling as 
they rely on the very types of stereotypes about women’s capacities and 
decision-making that earlier cases rejected.242 
While these cases suggest the danger of an intermediate standard, their 
effect and relevance may be limited as there is some evidence that the 
Court has since narrowed its “biological differences” jurisprudence.  
Though the Court accepted the government’s argument in Rostker,243 it 
rejected VMI’s argument fifteen years later in Virginia that women could 
be excluded from a military school, despite the fact that an alternate school 
                                                          
 236. See Charles Babington & Jo Becker, 1985 Memo by Alito Has Legal Weight, 
Senators Say, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111602093.html (discussing a controversial 
memo composed by Alito while working in the Solicitor General’s office). 
 237. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701 (2007) (indicting that Justice Kennedy concurred in part, concurred in the 
judgment, and filed the majority opinion). 
 238. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989). 
 239. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982). 
 240. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1979). 
 241. See Michael M. v. Sonoma Cnty. Super. Ct, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981). 
 242. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 82-83 (1981). 
 243. See id. 
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had been opened for women.244  The viability of the Court’s biological 
differences jurisprudence in the parental context is troubling given the 
acceptance of the INS’ argument in Nguyen in favor of a presumption of 
citizenship for children of citizen mothers as opposed to citizen fathers.245 
Nonetheless, a focus on these cases misinterprets the limited scope of 
this paper’s argument.  While I suggest that courts should adopt 
intermediate scrutiny when reviewing gender-based affirmative action 
programs, they may certainly adopt a stricter standard for statutory 
provisions that do not have a remedial purpose. 
Admittedly, a split approach for remedial and non-remedial gender-
based statutes would invite legislative attempts to mask programs 
motivated by non-remedial intentions as being remedial in nature.  Despite 
the clear remedial purposes of some programs, such as those at issue in 
Danskine or Long, other schemes, such as those in Hogan, may be more 
problematic.  While the Court’s narrowing of its real differences 
jurisprudence and its ability to effectively distinguish schemes, like Hogan, 
caution against such dangers, more scrutiny may indeed be required. 
Intermediate scrutiny “plus” does heighten the standard; however, by 
requiring a strict factual predicate, it, like strict scrutiny, effectively 
eliminates gender-based affirmative action programs.  While the Eleventh 
Circuit upheld the program at issue in Danskine, it is rare that localities will 
have available the evidence of specific discrimination available to Miami-
Dade County.  More often localities, such as those whose programs were at 
issue in Long, Lamprecht, and Concrete Works of Colorado, will only have 
evidence of disparity and not discriminatory intent.246  Following the 
court’s jurisprudence, an alternate approach that may adequately protect 
women while not eliminating the majority of affirmative action schemes 
would be to require evidence of disparity between males and females in the 
field, along with an increased focus on the schemes’ statutory language and 
legislative history.  Like the Court in Weinberger, courts could specifically 
look for benefits that are tied to a woman performing a role historically 
reserved for females.247  Like the Court in Orr, courts could more closely 
scrutinize statutes that rely on gender as a proxy when a non-gender-based 
                                                          
 244. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996). 
 245. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63-64 (2001) (relying on the necessary 
presence of the mother and not the father at the child’s birth); see also supra notes 79-
82 and accompanying text (recounting early “real differences” cases in the parental 
context). 
 246. See Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1197 (6th Cir. 1990); supra notes 
126-33, 144-48 and accompanying text (recounting the evidence presented in varied 
gender-based affirmative action cases). 
 247. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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formula would just as effectively provide deserving women benefits.248  
Like the Court in Goldfarb, courts could closely scrutinize a statute where 
its legislative history belied a motivation other than a need to remedy past 
discrimination against women, for example, the desire to devalue the work 
of women earners as opposed to men.249 
In addition, the Court could continue to narrow its “biological 
differences” jurisprudence while expanding the category of statutes 
representing archaic and overbroad stereotypes.  Feminist scholars have 
proposed a number of means by which to reformulate these standards to 
eliminate cases such as Nguyen in which the Court, even under its 
narrowed “biological differences” jurisprudence, approved a 
constitutionally questionable gender-based statute.  One alternative could 
be a version of Catherine MacKinnon’s “dominance approach” which 
would ask whether a statute tended to facilitate women’s subordination to 
men or alleviated it.250  If the latter, it would be regarded as representing a 
“real difference,” the history of discrimination women have faced, and if 
the former, an unacceptable stereotype.251 
However, feminist scholars have also buttressed the Croson rationale by 
accurately pointing out that the strict scrutiny standard not only protects 
women from legislatures masking discriminatory statutes as benign, but 
also protects women from discriminatory judges who may at once apply a 
more lenient standard of intermediate scrutiny toward discriminatory 
statutes.252  The Court’s decision in Nguyen, upholding a gender-based 
statute written by a five male majority with then-both female justices 
dissenting, confirms the real dangers of this claim.253  Admittedly, there is 
no complete means by which to eliminate such a danger.  However, four 
considerations suggest the limitations of this argument.  First, as discussed, 
the price of this alleged safety would be the crippling of legislative action 
as a means of remedying the history of gender discrimination in 
                                                          
 248. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. 
 250. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40 (1987) (“In this 
approach, an equality question is a question of the distribution of power.”). 
 251. See id. at 40-45. While MacKinnon presents a compelling argument for 
abandoning the scrutiny analysis all together, our approach may present a compromise 
means of incorporating their approaches without waiting for the unlikely abandonment 
of the courts approach to gender and racial based statutes for over forty years. 
 252. See David L. Kirp et al., Gender Justice and Its Critics, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 
1377, 1401 (1988) (citing Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1686, 1691-92 
(1980)) (“Moreover, Taub has suggested, and MacKinnon must recognize, that it is 
exceedingly unlikely that a supposedly male-dominated court system can successfully 
apply MacKinnon’s suggested standard of review.”). 
 253. See supra notes 165-170 and accompanying text. 
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employment.  Second, there is no guarantee that judges may not formulate 
new legal theorems, which would incorporate the discrimination employed 
through the utilization of intermediate scrutiny.  Third, as noted by 
feminists,254 if the law inherently represents male norms, a safety in 
equality under these male norms may not be safety at all.  Fourth, the 
increasing presence of women in the law and the judiciary provides hope 
that this danger may be slowly alleviated.  As stated, perhaps 
optimistically, by Martha Fineman: 
[F]eminists are no longer dependent on the Frankfurters of the world for 
the translation of our ideas.  Women now occupy professorships, are 
members of the bar, and make up almost half of all law school classes.  
A few of us are even legislators and judges.  While full integration of the 
professorship is far from complete (especially at the most powerful 
levels), feminist voices can at least give our own voices to our ideas.255 
Finally, the Croson court suggested that intermediate scrutiny would be 
unable to distinguish those statutes, which, even though allegedly 
supported by benign purposes, were unnecessary as a result of the 
elimination of the needs requiring the particular remediation initiative in 
the first place or which at their core were not based on the differential 
characteristic.256  As to the first, the Court’s decision in Hogan suggests the 
contrary.  In the context of a nursing school, where women dominated the 
field, the Court recognized the distinct lack of necessity for a statute 
preferring female applicants.257  Admittedly, a closer case involving a field 
where women were equally represented may require closer scrutiny by the 
Court of the statutes’ legislative history.  In addition, lower courts that 
applied intermediate scrutiny after Croson have also required a 
demonstrated disparity in the employment field.258  As to the second, the 
Court demonstrated an ability in Orr to reject a gender-based distinction 
where a narrower program aimed specifically at the problem, in that case, 
insolvency, would have sufficed.259 
Though the Croson majority framed its argument as legal, there is reason 
to think that its arguments belied skepticism of the need for affirmative 
                                                          
 254. See e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: 
Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 658 (1983) (indicating that this 
pervasiveness of male domination makes the application of rules impossible, for when 
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 255. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 39 (1995) (citations omitted). 
 256. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra notes 57-61, 107- 08 and accompanying text. 
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action and the effect of a history of discrimination in general.  Whereas a 
full scale examination of opportunities available to women in society and 
any resulting disparity is well beyond the scope of this paper, evidence 
gathered by the federal government suggests that women are 
underrepresented, specifically in leadership positions in a variety of fields 
and that this disparity is the result of a history of intentional exclusion.260 
2. The Stigma Communicated by Subjecting Gender-Based Affirmative 
Action Programs to Intermediate Scrutiny Would Be Offset Were the Court 
to Adopt Increased Scrutiny for Non-Benign Gender-Based Statutes. 
The argument that subjecting gender-based statutes to intermediate 
scrutiny while subjecting racially differential statutes to strict scrutiny 
disperses a larger societal message demeaning the value of women is not 
only troubling to my argument, but also flawed as it depends upon a 
particular societal framing of the issue.  Rather, the use of intermediate 
scrutiny in reviewing gender-based affirmative action programs might 
suggest society’s greater commitment to alleviating its history of 
discrimination against women, especially if combined with strict scrutiny 
for non-remedial statutes. 
As discussed, the limited argument presented by this paper is that 
intermediate scrutiny should be used specifically to review gender-based 
affirmative action programs.  A split approach subjecting non-remedial 
gender-based statutes to increased scrutiny finds support in some of the 
Court’s jurisprudence and writings.  The Croson court correctly observed 
that once the Court determines that a statutory scheme serves a benign or 
remedial purpose, its analysis becomes particularly deferential.261  
However, in J.E.B. and Craig, the Court rejected statistical support,262 and 
in the former, specifically rejected the jury preemption scheme despite the 
convincing nature of the empirical data presented.263  Furthermore, the split 
approach is supported by dicta in Justice Ginsburg’s VMI majority opinion.  
While requiring that gender-based statutes normally satisfy an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification,”264 she specifically exempted from 
this scrutiny those statutes that compensate women “for particular 
economic disabilities [they have] suffered” and to “promote equal 
employment opportunit[ies].”265  Admittedly, dictum is normally of little 
precedential consequence.  However, that the words are of Justice 
                                                          
 260. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 36-38, 153 and accompanying text. 
 263. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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Ginsburg, who filed many of the cases establishing gender as a protected 
class, including Frontiero, is of significance.266 
3. Arguments Stressing the Inconsistency Between the Application of 
Intermediate Scrutiny for Gender-Based Affirmative Action and Strict 
Scrutiny for Similar Race-Based Statutes Assume the Correctness of 
Croson. 
An argument stressing the perceived inconsistency that would result 
from the utilization of strict scrutiny in reviewing affirmative action 
programs benefiting African-Americans, a minority that acted as an 
impetus for the enactment of the Equal Protection Clause, and the use of 
intermediate scrutiny for programs benefiting women, are flawed in that 
they assume Croson was correctly decided. 
The reality is that constitutional scholars criticize Croson as the case that 
abandoned the original purpose behind the amendment.  Fearing that 
Croson would cause localities to abandon race-based remedial programs, 
Laurence Tribe organized a “Constitutional Scholars’ Conference” to 
create guidelines for local governments that would assist in the 
development of standards for programs that would fulfill Croson’s 
requirements.267  For Michael Rosenfeld, Croson was astonishing because 
it provided a “stark contrast between the apparent simplicity and clarity of 
the legal test that the Court embraced and that test’s inability to account 
coherently for the complexities inherent in the controversy that it 
purport[ed] to resolve.”268  Russell Galloway similarly responded:  “Croson 
stood the Equal Protection Clause on its head, converting it from a bulwark 
of equality to a guarantee of inequality and holding, for the first time ever, 
that governmental affirmative action programs containing remedial racial 
classification as unconstitutional unless strict scrutiny is satisfied.”269  
Kathleen Sullivan interpreted Croson as the Court’s response to a 
perceived societal backlash against affirmative action by addressing the 
dismay of displaced whites.270  However, it was paradoxically flawed to 
consider white resentment in the judicial review of affirmative action 
legislation while simultaneously ignoring black resentment of laws with 
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racially disproportionate effects.271 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments for applying strict scrutiny to gender-based statutes are 
certainly compelling.  Feminist legal scholars have long criticized not only 
the subtle attempts by legislatures to codify stereotypes about women’s 
roles and capacities, but also the Court’s refusal to sniff out these adverse 
motives.  Adding insult to injury is the symbolic message communicated 
by the application of reduced scrutiny to gender-based statutes when 
compared to the strict scrutiny applied to similar race-based schemes.  
While these arguments are compelling, they do not mandate that courts 
adopt or legal scholars advocate for any means available to solve these 
problems.  Rather, legal scholars and courts should recognize the viability 
of alternative means of solving these problems that would at once preserve 
the viability of gender-based affirmative action programs.  The alternative 
would be to severely limit the power of legislatures to address over 200 
years of gender-based discrimination in the United States, and as a result, 
freeze the limited opportunities available to women in a variety of 
employment fields. 
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